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Abstract
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such
as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game
or a yes–no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which
collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand, each of these
collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in
performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of
games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as
input. We consider four natural explicit representations: winning, losing,
minimal winning, and maximal losing. We first analyze the complexity of
testing whether a game is simple and testing whether a game is weighted.
We show that, for the four types of representations, both problems can be
solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity
of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type.
We analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which
are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. We finalize
with some considerations on the possibility of representing a game in a
more succinct representation showing a natural representation in which
the recognition problem is hard.
Keywords Simple/Weighted/Majority Games, NP-Completeness.
AMS Subject Classification 68Q, 91A.
1 Introduction
Simple game theory is a very dynamic and expanding field. Taylor and Zwicker
[28] pointed out that “few structures arise in more contexts and lend themselves
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to more diverse interpretations than do simple games”. Indeed, simple games
cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amend-
ment, is pitted against the status quo. In these systems, each voter responds
with a vote of “yea” or “nay”. A simple game or a yes–no voting system is a
set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage
of the issue at hand, each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning
coalition.
Democratic societies and international organizations use a wide variety of
complex rules to reach decisions. Examples, where it is not always easy to under-
stand the consequences of the way voting is done, include the Electoral College
to elect the President of the United States, the United Nations Security Council,
the governance structure of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the European Union Council of Ministers, the national governments of many
countries, the councils in several counties, and the system to elect the major
in cities or villages of many countries. Another source of examples comes from
economic enterprises whose owners are shareholders of the society and divide
profits or losses proportionally to the numbers of stocks they posses, but make
decisions by voting according to a pre-defined rule (i.e., an absolute majority
rule or a qualified majority rule).
There are several alternative ways to introduce a simple game; the most
natural is by giving the list of winning coalitions, then the complementary set is
the set of losing coalitions and the simple game is fully described. A considerable
reduction in introducing a simple game can be obtained by considering only the
list of minimal winning coalitions, i.e. winning coalitions which are minimal by
the inclusion operation. Coalitions containing minimal winning coalitions are
also winning. Analogously, one may present a simple game by using either the
set of losing coalitions or the set of maximal losing coalitions.
We are interested in performing a complexity analysis of problems on simple
games, in the case that the number of players is large, as pointed out in [7], from
a computational point of view, the key issues relating to coalitional games are,
first, how such games should be represented (since the obvious representation is
exponentially large in the number of players); and second, the extent to which
cooperative solution concepts can be efficiently computed. We undertake here
this task and to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that addresses
a such study.
Previous results have focused on problems where the input is a subclass of the
class of simple games, the so called weighted games. A way to describe a weighted
game is to assign a (positive) real number weight to each voter, and declare a
coalition to be winning precisely when its total weight meets or exceeds some
predetermined quota. Not every simple game is weighted but every simple game
can be decomposed as an intersection of some weighted games. Work with the
complexity of problems on weighted games dates back to [25], where Prasad and
Kelly provide NP-completeness results on determining properties of weighted
voting games. For instance, they show that computing standard political power
indices, such as absolute Banzhaf, Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley-Shubik, are
all NP-hard problems. More recent work is related with the notion of dimension
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considered by Taylor and Zwicker [27, 28]. The dimension of a simple game
is the minimum number of weighted games whose intersection coincides with
the game. The computational effort to weigh up the dimension of a simple
game, given as the intersection of d weighted games, was determined by De˘ıneko
and Woeginger [6]: computing the dimension of a simple game is a NP-hard
problem. More results on solution concepts for weighted games can be found in
[5, 17, 18, 3, 4, 7, 8]. There also exist works related to economics [29, 1, 13, 9].
Our first objective is to fix some natural game representations. After doing
so, as usual, we analyze the complexity of transforming one representation into
another and the complexity of the problem of recognizing simple games. Our
second aim is to classify the complexity of testing whether a simple game is
of a special type. Apart from weighted games there are some other subclasses
of simple games which are very significant in the literature of voting systems.
Strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity are, among others, desir-
able properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. Our results are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2.
Input → (N,W ) (N,L) (N,Wm) (N,LM )
Output ↓
(N,W ) – EXP EXP EXP
(N,L) EXP – EXP EXP
(N,Wm) P P – EXP
(N,LM ) P P EXP –
Table 1: Complexity of changing the representation form of a simple game.
Input → (N,W ) (N,Wm) (N,L) (N,LM ) (q;w)
IsSimple P P P P –
IsStrong P co-NPC P P co-NPC
IsProper P P P co-NPC co-NPC
IsWeighted P P P P –
IsHomogeneous P ? P ? ?
IsDecisive P ? P ? co-NPC
IsMajority P ? P ? co-NPC
Table 2: Our results on the complexity of problems on simple games.
Table 1 shows the complexity of passing from a given form to another one.
All explicit forms are represented by a pair (N,C) in which N = {1, . . . , n} for
some positive integer n, and C is the set of winning, minimal winning, losing or
maximal losing coalitions. Note that it is possible to pass from winning (or los-
ing) coalitions to minimal winning (or maximal losing) coalitions in polynomial
time, but the other swaps require exponential time. On the other hand, given a
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game in a specific form, Table 2 shows the complexity on determining whether
it is simple, strong, proper, weighted, homogeneous, decisive or majority. Here
(q;w) denotes an integer representation of a weighted game where q is the quota
and w are the weights. Observe that there are some problems that still remain
open.
Finally, we refer the reader to Papadimitriou [22] for the definitions of the
complexity classes P, NP, co-NP, and their subclasses of complete problems NPC
and co-NPC, and the counting class #P.
2 Recognizing simple games
We start stating some basic definitions on simple games (we refer the interested
reader to [28] for a thorough presentation).
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single
alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo.
Definition 1 A simple game Γ is a pair (N,W ) in which N = {1, . . . , n} for
some positive integer n, and W is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies
N ∈ W , ∅ /∈ W , and the monotonicity property: S ∈ W and S ⊆ R ⊆ N
implies R ∈W .
Any set of voters is called a coalition, the set N is called the grand coalition,
and the empty set ∅ is called the null coalition. Members of N are called players
or voters, and the subsets of N that are in W are called winning coalitions. The
intuition here is that a set S is a winning coalition iff the bill or amendment
passes when the players in S are precisely the ones who vote for it. A subset ofN
that is not in W is called a losing coalition. The collection of losing coalitions is
denoted by L. The set ofminimal winning coalitions (maximal losing coalitions)
is denoted by Wm (LM ), where a minimal winning coalition (a maximal losing
coalition) is a winning (losing) coalition all of whose proper subsets (supersets)
are losing (winning). Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely
determined by its set of minimal winning coalitions. A voter i is null if i /∈ S
for all S ∈Wm.
From a computational point of view a simple game can be given under
different representations. In this paper we essentially consider the following
options:
• Explicit or Extensive winning form: the game is given as (N,W ) by providing
a listing of the collection of subsets W .
• Explicit or Extensive minimal winning form: the game is given as (N,Wm)
by providing a listing of the family Wm. Observe that this form requires
less space than the explicit winning form whenever W 6= {N}.
When we consider descriptions of a game in terms of winning coalitions in
this paper, we also consider the corresponding representations for losing coali-
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tions, replacing minimal by maximal. Thus, in addition we also consider the
explicit or extensive losing, and explicit or extensive maximal losing forms.
We analyze first the computational complexity of obtaining a representation
of a game in a given form when a representation in another form is given.
Theorem 2 Given a simple game:
i. passing from the explicit winning (losing) form to the explicit minimal
winning and maximal losing (maximal losing and minimal winning) form
can be done in polynomial time.
ii. passing from the explicit minimal winning (maximal losing) form to the
explicit winning (losing) form requires exponential time.
iii. passing from the explicit minimal winning (maximal losing) form to the
explicit maximal losing (minimal winning) form requires exponential time.
iv. passing from the explicit minimal winning (maximal losing) form to the
explicit losing (winning) form requires exponential time.
v. passing from the explicit winning (losing) form to the explicit losing (win-
ning) form requires exponential time.
This theorem gives us all the results presented in Table 1. The polynomial
time results are obtained from simple properties of monotonic sets. For the
exponential time transformations we provide examples in which the size of the
representation increases exponentially. The transformations are similar to the
ones used to show that computing a CNF1 from a given DNF2 requires expo-
nential time. The difference relies in that now instead of transforming the same
formula we have to get a diferent maximal normal form for a formula and its
negation.
Before proving Theorem 2 in detail, we introduce some notations and defi-
nitions together with some preliminary technical results.
Given a family of subsets C of a set N , C denotes the closure of C under ⊆,
and C the closure of C under ⊇.
Definition 3 A subset C of a set N is closed under ⊆ (⊇) if C = C (C).
The following lemma is proved in [22].
Lemma 4 Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we can check whether it is
closed under ⊆ or ⊇ in polynomial time.
Lemma 5 Given a family of subsets C of a set N , the families C
m
and CM
can be obtained in polynomial time.
1A Boolean formula is in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) if it is a conjunction of disjun-
tion of literals.
2A Boolean formula is in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) if it is a standardization (or
normalization) of a logical formula which is a disjunction of conjuntion of literals.
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Proof Observe that, for any set S in C we have to check whether there is a
subset (superset) of S that forms part of C, and keep those S that do not have
this property. Therefore, the complete computation can be done in polynomial
time on the input length of C.
Now we define the minimal and maximal subset families.
Definition 6 Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we say that it is minimal
if C = C
m
.
Definition 7 Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we say that it is maximal
if C = CM .
As a consequence of Lemma 5 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 8 Given a family of subsets C of a set N , we can check whether it
is maximal or minimal in polynomial time.
The proof of Theorem 2 is splitted into five lemmata. We start with our first
result for simple games given in explicit winning or losing form.
Lemma 9 Given a simple game Γ in explicit winning (or losing) form, the
representation of Γ in explicit minimal winning or maximal losing (maximal
losing or minimal winning) form can be obtained in polynomial time.
Proof Given a simple game Γ = (N,W ), consider the set
R =
|N |⋃
i=1
W−i
where W−i = {S \ {i} : i ∈ S ∈ W}. Observe that all the sets in R \W are
losing coalitions, R \W ⊆ L. We claim that (R \W )M = LM . We are going to
prove that in two steps:
• (R \W )M ⊆ LM : Now suppose that T ∈ (R \W )M and that T /∈ LM .
Consequently we have that T ∈ L and that T ∪ {i} ∈ W for some i ∈ N .
We also have that T ⊂ U for some U ∈ L. Due to the monotonicity we
conclude that U ∪{i} ∈W . This means that U ∈ R\W which contradicts
that T is maximal in R \W .
• LM ⊆ (R \W )M : We will show this inclusion in two steps:
i. LM ⊆ R \W : If T ∈ LM then T ∪ {i} ∈ W for any i /∈ T . Thus T
can be obtained from a winning coalition (T ∪{i}) from removing an
element (i). This means that T ∈ R \W since T is a losing coalition.
ii. Maximal elements in a set will also be maximal in any subset they
appear in. From LM ⊆ R\W ⊆ L we conclude that LM ⊆ (R\W )M .
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For the cost of the algorithm, observe that, given (N,W ), the set R has
cardinality at most |N | · |W |, and thus R can be obtained in polynomial time.
Using Lemma 5, fromW and R\W , we can computeWm and LM in polynomial
time.
Analogously, when the game is given by the family of losing coalitions a
symmetric argument provides the proof for explicit maximal losing or minimal
winning form.
Now we focus on simple games given in explicit minimal winning or explicit
maximal losing form.
Lemma 10 Given a simple game Γ in explicit minimal winning (maximal los-
ing) form, computing the representation of Γ in explicit winning (losing) form
requires exponential time.
Proof The following two examples show that the size of the computed family
can be exponential in the size of the given one. Therefore, any algorithm that
solves the problem requires exponential time.
Consider N = {1, . . . , n}, then:
i. The simple game defined byWm =
⋃n
i=1{{i}} hasW = {T ⊆ N : T 6= ∅}.
Therefore, |Wm| = n and |W | = 2n − 1.
ii. The simple game defined by LM = {T ⊆ N : |T | = n− 1} has L = {T ⊂
N}. Therefore, |LM | = n and |L| = 2n − 1.
Lemma 11 Given a simple game Γ in explicit minimal winning (maximal los-
ing) form, computing the representation of Γ in explicit maximal losing (minimal
winning) form requires exponential time.
Proof In a similar way as we did in the previous Lemma, we show two
examples which size of the computed family can be exponential in the size of
the given one.
Consider N = {1, . . . , 2n} and coalitions Si = {2i−1, 2i}, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then,
i. The simple game defined by Wm =
⋃n
i=1{Si} has
LM = {T ⊆ N : |T ∩ Si| = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , n}.
Therefore, |Wm| = n and |LM | = 2n.
ii. The simple game defined by
Wm = {T ⊆ N : |T ∩ Si| = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , n}
has LM =
⋃n
i=1{N \ Si}. Therefore, |W
m| = 2n and |LM | = n.
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As a consequence of Lemmata 9 and 11 we have Corollary 12.
Corollary 12 Given a simple game Γ in explicit minimal winning (maximal
losing) form, computing the representation of Γ in explicit losing (winning) form
requires exponential time.
The remaining cases of Theorem 2 are again computationally hard.
Lemma 13 Given a simple game Γ in explicit winning (losing) form, comput-
ing the representation of Γ in explicit losing (winning) form requires exponential
time.
Proof We present two examples where the size of the computed family is
exponential in the size of the given one. Let (N,W ) be the game, where W =
{N}, then |W | = 1 and |L| = 2|N |−1. Similarly, let (N,W ) be the game, where
L = {∅}, then |W | = 2|N | − 1 and |L| = 1.
Lemmata (9)-(13) make up Theorem 2.
The next step is to analyze the computational complexity of the following
recognition problems:
Name: IsSimpleE
Input: (N,C)
Question: Is (N,C) a correct explicit representation of a simple
game?
We have in total four different problems depending on the input description:
winning, minimal winning, losing and maximal losing. However, the recognition
problem becomes polynomial time solvable in all these cases.
Theorem 14 The IsSimpleE problem belongs to P for any explicit form F:
winning, minimal winning, losing, or maximal losing.
Proof The proof follows from the fact that given a family of subsets C of a
set N , the families of minimal or maximal sets of its closure can be obtained in
polynomial time. It is a direct consequence of Lemmata 4 and 5 and Corollary 8,
stating that whether the family is monotonic3 or minimal/maximal can be tested
in polynomial time.
Observe that, as the recognition problem can be solved in polynomial time,
we can use any of the proposed representations in further complexity analysis.
3We say that a family of sets is monotonic iff it satisfies the monotonicity property.
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3 Problems on simple games
In this section we consider a set of decision problems related to properties that
define some special types of simple games (again we refer the reader to [28]). In
general we will state a property P for simple games and consider the associated
decision problem which has the form:
Name: IsP
Input: A simple game Γ
Question: Does Γ satisfy property P?
Further considerations on the complexity of such problems will be stated in
terms of the input representation.
3.1 Recognizing strong and proper games
Now we study the complexity of determining if a given simple game (in explicit
form) is strong, weak, proper or improper.
Definition 15 A simple game (N,W ) is strong if S /∈ W implies N \ S ∈ W .
A simple game that is not strong is called weak.
Intuitively speaking, if a game is weak it has to few winning coalitions, be-
cause adding sufficiently many winning coalitions would make the game strong.
Note that the addition of winning coalitions can never destroy strongness.
Definition 16 A simple game (N,W ) is proper if S ∈ W implies N \ S /∈ W .
A simple game that is not proper is called improper.
An improper game has to many winning coalitions, in the sense that deleting
sufficiently many winning coalitions would make the game proper. Note that
the deletion of winning coalitions can never destroy properness.
When a game is both proper and strong, a coalition wins iff its complement
loses. Therefore, in this case we have |W | = |L| = 2n−1.
A related concept with the properness and strongness is the dualityness.
Definition 17 Given a simple game (N,W ), its dual game is (N,W ∗), where
S ∈ W ∗ if and only if N \ S /∈ W .
That is, winning coalitions in the dual game are just the “blocking” coalitions
in the original game. Thus, (N,W ) is proper iff (N,W ∗) is strong, and (N,W )
is strong iff (N,W ∗) is proper.
Theorem 18 The IsStrong problem, when the input game is given in explicit
losing or maximal losing form, and the IsProper problem, when the game is
given in explicit winning or minimal winning form, can be solved in polynomial
time.
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Proof
To prove this result we provide an adequate formalization of the strong and
proper properties in terms of simple properties of the set of minimal winning
or maximal losing coalitions respectively. Those properties can be checked in
polynomial time when the games are given in the specified forms.
First observe that, given a family of subsets F , we can check, for any set in
F , whether its complement is not in F in polynomial time. Therefore, taking
into account the definitions, we have that the IsStrong problem, when the
input is given in explicit losing form, and the IsProper problem, when the
input is given in explicit winning form, are polynomial time solvable.
Thus, taking into account that
• A simple game is weak iff
∃S ⊆ N : S ∈ L ∧ N \ S ∈ L
which is equivalent to
∃S ⊆ N : ∃L1, L2 ∈ L
M : S ⊆ L1 ∧ N \ S ⊆ L2
The last assertion is equivalent to the fact that there are two maximal
losing coalitions L1 and L2 such that L1 ∪ L2 = N .
• A simple game is improper iff
∃S ⊆ N : S ∈W ∧ N \ S ∈ W
which is equivalent to
∃S ⊆ N : ∃W1,W2 ∈ W
m :W1 ⊆ S ∧ W2 ⊆ N \ S.
This last assertion is equivalent to the fact that there are two minimal
winning coalitions W1 and W2 such that W1 ∩W2 = ∅.
Observe that, given a family of subsets F , checking whether any one of the two
conditions hold can be done in polynomial time. Thus the theorem holds also
when the set of maximal losing (or minimal winning) coalitions is given.
As a consequence of Theorems 2 and 18 we have:
Corollary 19 The IsStrong problem, when the input game is given in explicit
winning form, and the IsProper problem, when the game is given in explicit
losing form, can be solved in polynomial time.
Our next result states the complexity of the IsStrong problem when the
game is given in the remaining form.
Theorem 20 The IsStrong problem is co-NP-complete when the input game
is given in explicit minimal winning form.
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Proof The membership proof follows from an adequate formalization. To
prove hardness we consider the set splitting problem which asks whether it is
possible to partition N into two subsets P and N \ P such that no subset in a
given collection C is entirely contained in either P or N \ P . It is known that
the problem is NP-complete [12]. We provide a polynomial time reduction from
set splitting to the IsWeak problem. In other words we have to decide whether
P ⊆ N exists such that
∀S ∈ C : S 6⊆ P ∧ S 6⊆ N \ P (1)
We transform a set splitting instance (N,C) into the simple game in explicit
minimal winning form (N,Cm). This transformation can be computed in poly-
nomial time according to Lemma 5. We will now show that (N,C) has a set
splitting iff (N,Cm) is a weak game:
• Now assume that P ⊆ N satisfying (1) exists. This means that P and
N \ P are losing coalitions in the game (N,Cm).
• Let P and N \ P be losing coalitions in the game (N,Cm). As a conse-
quence we have that S 6⊆ P and S 6⊆ N \ P for any S ∈ Cm. This implies
that S 6⊆ P and S 6⊆ N \P holds for any S ∈ C since any set in C contains
a set in Cm.
Finally we prove a similar complexity result for the remaining version of the
IsProper problem.
Theorem 21 The IsProper problem is co-NP-complete when the input game
is given in extensive maximal losing form.
Proof The hardness of the IsProper problem is obtained by using duality
and providing a polynomial time reduction from the IsStrong problem.
From Definition 16, a game is improper if and only if there exists a coalition
S ⊆ N such that neither S nor N \ S is contained in a member of LM . For a
given coalition S we can easily perform this check in polynomial time. Therefore
the problem IsImproper belongs to NP, and the problem IsProper belongs
to co-NP.
To complete the proof we provide a reduction from the IsStrong problem
for games given in extensive minimal winning form. First observe that, if a
family C of subsets of N is minimal then the family {N \L : L ∈ C} is maximal.
Given a game Γ = (N,Wm), in minimal winning form, let us consider its dual
game Γ′ = (N, {N \ L : L ∈ Wm}) given in maximal losing form. Of course Γ′
can be obtained from Γ in polynomial time. Thus Γ is weak iff
∃S ⊆ N : S ∈ L(Γ) ∧ N \ S ∈ L(Γ)
which is equivalent to
∃S ⊆ N : N \ S ∈ W (Γ′) ∧ S ∈W (Γ′)
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iff Γ′ is improper.
Thus, the IsProper problem belongs to co-NP and it is co-NP-hard – in
other words it is co-NP-complete.
3.2 Recognizing weighted games
In this subsection we study the complexity of determining if a given simple game
(in explicit form) is weighted, homogeneous, majority or decisice.
Definition 22 A simple game (N,W ) is weighted if there exist a “ quota”
q ∈ R and a “weight function” w : N → R such that each coalition S is
winning exactly when the sum of weights of S meets or exceeds q.
Weighted games are probably the most important kind of simple games.
Any specific example of a weight function w and quota q is said to realize G
as a weighted game. A particular realization of a weighted game is denoted
(q;w1, . . . , wn), or briefly (q;w). By w(S) we denote
∑
i∈S wi.
Observe also that, from the monotonicity property, it is obvious that a simple
game (N,W ) is weighted iff there exist a “quota” q ∈ R and a “weight function”
w : N → R such that
w(S) ≥ q ∀ S ∈Wm
w(S) < q ∀ S ∈ LM .
Theorem 23 The IsWeighted problem can be solved in polynomial time when
the input game is given in explicit winning, losing, minimal winning and maxi-
mal losing forms.
Proof A simple polynomial time reduction from the IsWeighted problem to
the Linear Programming problem, which is known to be solvable in polynomial
time [15, 16], gives the result for the cases of explicit winning and explicit losing
forms.
Taking into account Lemma 5, in both cases we can obtain Wm and LM in
polynomial time. Once this is done we can write, again in polynomial time, the
following Linear Programming instance Π:
min q
subject to w(S) ≥ q if S ∈Wm
w(S) < q if S ∈ LM
0 ≤ wi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
0 ≤ q
As (N,W ) is weighted iff Π has a solution, the proposed construction is a
polynomial time reduction.
For the minimal winning form we provide a reduction to the threshold func-
tion problem for monotonic DNF formula which is known to be polynomial
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time solvable [14, 24]. For the maximal winning form we make use of duality
and provide a reduction to the problem when the input is described in minimal
losing form.
Given (N,Wm), we are going to prove that we can decide in polynomial
time whether a simple game is weighted.
For C ⊆ N we let xC ∈ {0, 1}n denote the vector with the i’th coordinate
equal to 1 if and only if i ∈ C. In polynomial time we transform Wm into the
Boolean function ΦW m given by the DNF formula:
ΦW m(x) =
∨
S∈W m
(∧i∈Sxi)
By construction we have the following:
ΦW m(xC) = 1⇔ C is winning in the game given by (N,W
m) (2)
Note that ΦW m is a threshold function if and only if the game given by
(N,Wm) is weighted:
• only if (⇒): Assume that ΦW m is a threshold function. Let w ∈ Rn be
the weights and q ∈ R the threshold value. Thus we have that
ΦW m(xC) = 1⇔ 〈w, xC〉 ≥ q
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual inner product. By using (2) we conclude
that the game given by (N,Wm) is weighted.
• if (⇐): Now assume that the game given by (N,Wm) is weighted and that
(q;w) is a realization of such game. In this case we have the following:
C is winning in the game given by (N,Wm)⇔ 〈w, xC〉 ≥ q
Again we use (2) and conclude that ΦW m is a threshold function.
The Boolean function ΦW m is monotonic (i.e. positive) so according to the
papers [14, 24] (pages 211 and 59, respectively) we can in polynomial time
decide whether ΦW m is a threshold function. Consequently we can also decide
in polynomial time whether the game given by (N,Wm) is weighted.
On the other hand, we can prove a similar result given (N,LM ) just taking
into account that a game Γ is weighted iff its dual game Γ′ is weighted. Then,
we can use the technique from the proof of Theorem 21.
It is important to remark that it is known that “a simple game is weighted iff
it is trade robust iff it is invariant-trade robust” [7, 28, 10]. Thus, according to
Theorem 23, checking whether a simple game is trade robust or invariant-trade
robust can be done in polynomial time.
Corollary 24 The IsTradeRobust and the IsInvariantTradeRobust prob-
lem can be solved in polynomial time when the input game is given in explicit
winning, minimal winning, losing or maximal losing form.
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3.3 Recognizing homogeneous, decisive and majority games
In this section we define the homogeneous, decisive and majority games and,
afterwards, we analyze the complexity of the IsHomogeneous, IsDecisive
and IsMajority problems.
Definition 25 A weighted game (N,W ) is homogeneous if there exist a real-
ization (q;w) such that q = w(S) for all S ∈ Wm.
That is, a weighted game is homogeneous iff the sum of the weights of any
minimal winning coalition is equal to the quota.
Theorem 26 The IsHomogeneous problem can be solved in polynomial time
when the input game is given in explicit winning or losing form.
Proof The polynomial time reduction from the IsHomogeneous problem
to the Linear Programming problem, is done in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 23, but considering the instance Π′ obtained by replacing w(S) ≥ q,
in the first set of inequalities of Π, by w(S) = q. It is immediate to see that
(N,W ) is homogeneous iff Π′ has a solution. This modification provides the
proof of Theorem 26.
Now we introduce the remaining subclasses of simple games.
Definition 27 A simple game is decisive (or self–dual, or constant sum) if it
is proper and strong. A simple game is indecisive if it is not decisive.
Note that the decisiveness is related with the dualityness. As we said before,
(N,W ) is proper iff (N,W ∗) is strong, and (N,W ) is strong iff (N,W ∗) is
proper. As a consequence, we have that a simple game (N,W ) is decisive iff
W =W ∗. On the other hand, W is closed under ⊆ or ⊇ iff W ∗ is closed under
⊆ or ⊇, respectively.
In the seminal work on game theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern [20]
only decisive simple games were considered. Nowadays, many governmental
institutions make their decisions through voting rules that are in fact decisive
games. If abstention is not allowed (see [11] for voting games with abstention)
ties are not possible in decisive games.
Another interesting subfamily of simple games are the so–called majority
games:
Definition 28 A simple game is a majority game if it is weighted and decisive.
Observe that, although a simple game can fail to be proper and fail to be
strong, this cannot happen with weighted games (the proof appears in [28]).
Proposition 29 Any weighted game is either proper or strong.
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From Proposition 29, it follows that there are three kind of weighted games:
proper but not strong, strong but not proper, and both strong and proper.
From Theorem 23 and taking into account that decisive games are charac-
terized by having 2n−1 winning coalitions, we have the following result.
Theorem 30 The IsMajority and the IsDecisive problems can be solved in
polynomial time when the input game is given in explicit winning or losing form.
Proof Given a monotonic simple game (N,W ), it is proper iff |W | ≤ 2n−1
and, it is strong iff |L| ≤ 2n−1. Thus, a game is both proper and strong iff
|W | = |L| = 2n−1, and this test can be performed in polynomial time when W
or L is given. Furthermore, under both forms, we can check in addition whether
the game is weighted in polynomial time using Theorem 23.
4 Problems on weighted games
In this section we consider weighted games which are described by an integer
realization (q;w). Observe that it is well–known that any weighted game ad-
mits an integer realization (see for instance [2]), that is, a weight function with
nonnegative integer values, and a positive integer as quota. Integer realizations
naturally arise; just consider the seats distributed among political parties in
any voting system. In consequence we assume an integer realization as repre-
sentation of a weighted game. We analyze the complexity of problems of the
type:
Name: IsP
Input: An integer realization (q;w) of a weighted game Γ.
Question: Does Γ satisfy P?
We are interested in such problems associated to the properties of being
strong, proper, homogeneous, and majority4. Observe that for weighted games
majority and decisive are just the same property, so we consider only the ma-
jority games.
From now on some of the proofs are based on reductions from the NP-
complete problem Partition [12], which is defined as:
Name: Partition
Input: n integer values, x1, . . . , xn
Question: Is there S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} for which
∑
i∈S xi =
∑
i/∈S xi.
Observe that, for any instance of the Partition problem in which the sum
of the n input numbers is odd, the answer must be no.
4Note that the definition of majority weighted games given in [6] is equivalent to our
definition of weighted games.
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Theorem 31 The IsStrong, IsProper and IsMajority (here, equivalent
to IsDecisive) problems, when the input is described by an integer realization
of a weighted game (q;w), are co-NP-complete.
Proof From the definitions of strong, proper and majority games, it is straight-
forward to show that the three problems belong to co-NP.
Observe that the weighted game with integer representation (2; 1, 1, 1) is
proper and strong, and thus decisive.
We transform an instance x = (x1, . . . , xn) of the Partition problem into
a realization of a weighted game according to the following schema
f(x) =
{
(q(x);x) when x1 + · · ·+ xn is even,
(2; 1, 1, 1) otherwise.
The function f can be computed in polynomial time provided q does, and we
will use a different q for each problem.
Nevertheless, independently of q, when x1+· · ·+xn is odd, x is a no input for
partition, but f(x) is a yes instance of IsStrong, IsProper, and IsMajority,
and thus a no instance of the complementary problems.
Therefore, we have to take care only of the case in which x1+· · ·+xn is even.
Assume that this is the case and let s = (x1 + · · ·+ xn)/2 and N = {1, . . . , n}.
We will provide the proof that f reduces Partition to the complementary
problem.
a) IsStrong problem.
For the case of strong games, taking q(x) = s+ 1, we have:
• If there is a S ⊂ N such that
∑
i∈S xi = s, then
∑
i/∈S xi = s, thus both
S and N \ S are losing coalitions and f(x) is weak.
• Now assume that S andN\S are both losing coalitions in f(x) If
∑
i∈S xi <
s then
∑
i/∈S xi ≥ s + 1, which contradicts that N \ S is losing. Thus we
have that
∑
i∈S xi =
∑
i6∈S xi = s, and there exists a partition of x.
Therefore, f is a polytime reduction from Partition to IsWeak
b) IsProper problem.
For the case of proper games we take q(x) = s. Then, if there is a S ⊂ N
such that
∑
i∈S xi = s, then
∑
i/∈S xi = s, thus both S and N \ S are winning
coalitions and f(x) is improper. When f(x) is improper
∃S ⊆ N :
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ s ∧
∑
i/∈S
xi ≥ s,
and thus
∑
i∈S xi = s. Thus, we have a polytime reduction from Partition to
IsImproper.
c) IsMajority problem.
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For the case of majority games we take again q(x) = s. Observe that f(x)
cannot be weak, as in such a case there must be some S ⊆ N for which,∑
i∈S
xi < s ∧
∑
i/∈S
xi < s,
contradicting the fact that s = (x1 + · · · + xn)/2. Therefore, the game is not
majority iff it is improper, and the claim follows.
Before finishing this section we introduce the following related problem:
Name: IsHomogeneousRealization
Input: An integer realization (q;w) of a weighted game Γ.
Question: Is (q;w) a homogeneous realization?
Given the weights w, Rosenmu¨ller [26] solves the problem of computing all
q such that (q;w) is a homogeneous realization. Although in [26] the analysis
on the complexity is omitted, it is easy to check that the dynamic programming
algorithm given in Section 3 of [26] runs in polynomial time. Thus, given an in-
teger realization (q;w) it can be checked whether it is a homogeneous realization
in polynomial time.
Theorem 32 The IsHomogeneousRealization problem can be solved in
polynomial time.
Note that, given an integer realization (q;w) of a weighted game, we cannot
yet check whether this game is homogeneous, only whether a given realization
is a homogeneous one. We want to remark that the previous result does not
imply that the IsHomogeneous problem belongs to NP. Consider the problem
Name: IsAnotherRealization
Input: Two integer realizations (q;w) and (q′;w′).
Question: Is (q′;w′) another realization of the game (q, w)?
Observe that it is easy to show that (x1, . . . , xn) is a no instance of Partition
if and only if (s+ 1;x) is another realization of (s;x). Therefore the IsAnoth-
erRealization problem is co-NP-complete.
5 Succinct representations
We finish the analysis of simple games introducing a natural succinct represen-
tation of families of sets by means of Boolean formula. A Boolean formula Φ
on n variables provides a compact description of a family of subsets C of a set
N with n elements in the following way: we associate to each truth assignment
x = (x1, . . . , xn) the set Ax = {i | xi = 1}. Therefore Φ describes the family
of subsets {Ax | Φ(x) = 1} in a compact way. In consequence we consider the
following succinct representations
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• Succinct winning form: the game is given by (N,Φ) where Φ is a Boolean
formula on |N | variables providing a compact description of the sets in
W .
• Succinct minimal winning form: the game is given by (N,Φ) but now Φ
describes the family Wm. Observe again that this form might require less
space than the previous one whenever W 6= {N}.
In addition we consider the succinct losing and maximal losing forms. Our first
objective again is to analyze the complexity of the recognition problem.
Name: IsSimpleS
Input: (N,Φ)
Question: Is (N,Φ) a correct succinct representation of a simple
game?
As it happened with IsSimpleE problem, we have in total four different
problems depending on the input description: winning, minimal winning, losing
and maximal losing.
Unfortunately we can show that the recognition problem is hard in all the
proposed succinct forms thus forbidding a posterior use of such representations.
Theorem 33 The IsSimpleS problem is co-NP-complete for any succinct form
F: winning or losing, and co-NP-hard for any succinct form F: minimal winning
or maximal losing.
Proof Observe that, from the Definition 1 of the monotonicity property, a
set W (L) is not monotonic iff there are two sets S1 and S2 such that S1 ⊆ S2
but S1 ∈ W and S2 /∈ W (S1 /∈ L and S2 ∈ L). When the game is given in
succinct winning or losing form, these tests can be done by guessing two truth
assignments x1 and x2 and checking that x1 < x2, ΦW (x1) = 1 and ΦW (x2) = 0
(ΦL(x1) = 0 and ΦL(x2) = 1). Both properties can be checked in polynomial
time once S1 and S2 are given. Thus the problems belong to co-NP.
A Boolean formula ismonotonic if for any pair of truth assignments x, y, such
that x ≤ y in canonical order (i.e., xi ≤ yi for all i), we have that Φ(x) ≤ Φ(y)
(assuming that false < true). The latter problem (i.e., to know whether a
Boolean formula is monotonic or not) is co-NP-complete (even for DNF formu-
las) [19]. Consider the following reduction: Given a boolean formula Φ on n
variables we construct Φ′ on n+ 2 variables as follows
Φ′(αβx) =


1 α = β = 1
0 α = β = 0
Φ(x) α 6= β
Now we have that Φ is monotonic iff Φ′ is monotonic. Furthermore we have
that Φ′ is monotonic iff (N,Φ′) is a simple game in the explicit winning form
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since Φ′(1n) = 1 and Φ′(0n) = 0. This shows that IsSimpleS for the explicit
winning form is co-NP-complete. Observe that (N,ΦL) is an explicit loosing
representation of a simple game iff (N,¬ΦL) is an explicit winning represen-
tation of a simple game. Then the IsSimpleS for the explicit loosing form is
co-NP-complete.
Recall now that the sat problem asks whether a given Boolean formula has
a satisfying assignment. sat is a well known NP-complete problem. Consider
the following reduction: Given a boolean formula φ on n variables we construct
Φ for minimal winning forms on n+ 2 variables as follows
Φ(αβx) =


1, if α = β = 1 and x = 1n
0, if α = β = 1 and x 6= 1n
φ(x), if α 6= β
0, if α = β = 0
We have that φ does not have satisfying assignment iff Φ describes a non empty
minimal winning set. Similarly for maximal losing forms, now we should con-
sider
Φ(αβx) =


0, if α = β = 1
φ(x), if α 6= β
0, if α = β = 0 and x 6= 0n
1, if α = β = 0 and x = 0n
Thus the minimal winning and the maximal losing problems are co-NP-hard.
Observe that in the case that Φ representsWm(LM ) we have to check on one
side that the represented set is minimal (maximal) and second that the formula
has a satisfying assignment different from 0n. This places the problem in the
class DP [23]. The exact classification of those problems remains open.
6 Conclusions and open problems
We have analyzed different representations for simple games: explicit and suc-
cinct representations. All explicit forms that we have considered are represented
by a pair (N,C) in which N = {1, . . . , n} for some positive integer n, and C is
the set of winning, minimal winning, losing or maximal losing coalitions.
For the four proposed explicit representations of a simple game, we have
studied the complexity of deciding whether the given game is strong, proper,
weighted, homogeneous, decisive or majority. In the same vein, given a weighted
game described by an integer representation (q;w), we have also considered the
complexity of deciding whether the game is strong, proper, homogeneous or
majority.
As this is the first time in which problems on simple games are analyzed
there are still many interesting open question as there are many other interest-
ing properties on simple games. With respect to the unclassified problems on
Table 2 we conjecture the following:
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Conjecture 34 The IsDecisive problem is co-NP-complete when the input
game is given in explicit minimal winning or maximal losing form.
Conjecture 35 The IsMajority problem is co-NP-complete when the input
game is given in explicit minimal winning or maximal losing form.
We would also like to remark that our study can be enlarged by considering
new explicit forms to present a simple game. For example, blocking coalitions
and minimal blocking coalitions provide an alternative way to fully describe a
simple game. Precisely, a blocking coalition wins whenever its complementary
loses. From the point of view of succinct representations, there are other pro-
posals for representing a simple game, which make use of Boolean functions
or weighted representations. For example the multilinear extension of a sim-
ple game [21], succinct representations [19], or the intersection of a collection of
weighted games[6]. It will be of interest to perform a similar complexity analysis
on such representations.
Interestingly enough, we have shown in Theorem 23 that we can decide
in polynomial time whether a simple game is weighted. This result opens the
possibility of analyzing the complexity of problems on weighted games described
in a explicit form. In particular, as weighted games are games with dimension
1, our results imply that we can decide in polynomial time whether a simple
game has dimension 1. Recall that the results in [6] show that computing the
dimension of a simple game is NP-hard. The latter result is obtained when the
game is described as the intersection of some weighted games. It will be of
interest to determine whether the dimension of a simple game given in explicit
form can be computed in polynomial time. The same questions can also be
formulated for other parameters and solution concepts on simple games.
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